Tag Archives: security

Radicalisation in the Police

Radicalisation is defined as favouring revolutionary means for social change. The question is: what constitutes in the mind of an individual the notion of inevitability of social change and employing violent means for its realisation? Three factors influence an individual’s behaviour – internal social environment, external social interaction and international polarity system. The internal social environment encompasses the immediate social setup wherein an individual thrives and receives primary education or learning. The external social interaction covers all secondary actors who frequently meet the individual and discuss issues of mutual concern. It may also cover organisational sub-culture, which constantly influences a person during working hours. International polarity, on the other hand, is defined as the global system of governance whose parameters are set by leading developed countries and implemented across the globe. An individual gets the idea of the international polarity system through social media, external social interaction or electronic and print mass communication means. These three factors have a different impact on an individual’s radicalisation process – irrespective of his or her socio-cultural background. The radicalised individual looks for an opportunity to react at times violently and at times non-violently. These reactions get impetus due to a lose governing infrastructure and passive social control in a country or region. In regimented organisations individuals are usually subjected to disciplined lives. However, as lawlessness increases and the state loses its legitimacy of monopoly of control over violence the chances of radicalisation among members of regimented organisations increase many fold. Secondly, internal organisational dysfunctionality engenders opportunities for the radicalized members to exhibit their expressions forcefully. Such action was observed when Mumtaz Qadri, an Elite qualified Punjab Police employee, officially deputed on the security duty of the governor of Punjab, attacked and killed his benefactor in January 2011 in Islamabad despite his radicalised behaviour being reported to his superiors before the incident. Similarly, investigation reports on a number of terror attacks on law-enforcement agencies (LEAs) reveal that terrorists were abetted by insiders in carrying out such deadly acts. The army has tried to mitigate the internal threat through different reforms focusing on junior officers’ welfare, enhancing officer-subordinate communication frequency and enforcing strict discipline in all ranks. Unfortunately, such mechanisms have not been adopted in police organisations in Pakistan. Resultantly, chances of radicalisation have increased in the police force; this can dent the government’s resolve to fight terrorism. After the Mumtaz Qadri episode, psychologists were hired in Punjab to determine the mental and physical suitability of police officials for sensitive security duties. Nearly, 6291 police force members underwent psychological profiling; 1342 were verified, 17 were declared unsuitable for security duties and 4949 profiles are still pending with authorities. The practice of psychological profiling has been disrupted in 2015, leaving more than 100,000 police personnel without any official record formulation on mental stability. Close monitoring is urgently required with high frequency of officer-subordinate interactions so that the clear and precise picture of each force member can be documented. The resource distribution is also lopsided in the police department wherein 85 percent budget is consumed on pay and allowances. The amount available for force welfare is so small that no meaningful change can be envisaged in force outlook within a span of few years. In the Khyber Pakhtunkwa Police Department, which has a total strength of about 75,000, a scanning programme has been designed which has so far tested 35,000 police personnel. The points of scanning police officials include past history, family backgrounds, tribal affiliations, jihadi participation, Afghanistan tours, criminal records and income sources. These benchmarks however are not able to pinpoint the inclination towards radicalisation in an official. This is one of the reasons why only a hundred individuals have been earmarked as radicals who are currently being subjected to a thorough probe before any final decision can be taken about their future. So far not a single official has been dismissed on account of being declared a radical person in the KP police force. Nonetheless, no model exists for radicalisation detection in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. In the Punjab Police Department, the psychological analysis is principally based on detecting mental equilibrium and extremist inclination during a written exercise for police officials. We have devised a de-radicalisation model but we lack a radicalisation detection mechanism for probable phasing out of suspected officials during the scanning process. The radicalisation mechanism should be based on detecting the social, ideological, political, cultural and religious inclinations of an individual. The mechanism should hinge upon the following six factors. First, the self-identification of an individual be maintained as well as how s/he defines his/her character – for example, whether an individual associates with a religious figure or defines his character in a neutral way. If the individual likes a particular national or international leader then we need to see the key characteristics of that leader. Second, how does the individual see himself vis-a-vis the whole society? Does he isolate himself or negate social alienation? Does the person express feelings for or against the government? Are there any changes in personal narratives or not? Third, the mode of social interaction and kind of social capital that an individual enjoys while living under a peculiar socio-cultural environment must be part of the radicalisation detection method. If a person has the knack of getting influenced easily and has large religious capital then s/he must be categorised carefully leading to expulsion. Fourth, whether the individual is emotionally stable or not sends alert signals on many counts including static or mobile duty suitability and VVIP protection protocol assignment deployment. Fifth, does an individual have any visible ties with tribes who are belligerent or antithetical to government policies? Does the official belong to a group having nexus with terror operators or not? Does the individual bear any connections with cross-border insurgents or not? Does the person under review have a high percentage of unpredictable behaviour when subjected to demanding situations or not? These guidelines must fit into the radicalisation model effectively. Lastly, does the person know how to use digital-electronic devices or not? The more evasive and indirect the questions encompassing all the indicators, the more precise the data compilation on radicalisation in police organisations. It is time to introduce these measures in police organisations otherwise police field formations will not be able to hold out a cleared area.

Faisal Ali Raja Thursday, July 09, 2015

The writer is in the police service of Pakistan. Email: far2105@caa.columbia.edu

ISIS: Security Challenges to Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

The Islamic State represents a logical continuation of al Qaeda that triggered both a sense of Islamic power and shaped the United States and its allies into a threat to Islam. It has created a military and political framework to exploit the situation that al Qaeda created. Its military operations have been impressive and its fighters’ demonstrate enormous flexibility in the battlefield.

The fall of the Soviet Union has set in motion the events never contemplated before as apparent defeat of al Qaeda has opened the door for its logical successor, the Islamic State. The question at hand is whether the regional and international powers want to control the Islamic State or would prioritize their turf battles.

And at the heart of that question is the mystery of Islamic State ability to supply large numbers of forces, their war waging material and other crucial resources and the combat training. It is puzzling from where they get these resources and the training. In rare display of considerable flexibility on the battlefield, they have managed to take rebel forces in Syria and Iraq through a surprised large-scale offensive aimed at securing more territory along the Syria-Turkish border.

Mentioning of the Alawites in Syria is important, being a leading group fighting against Islamic States in the vicious Syrian civil war along with Free Syrian Army, Kurdish People’s Protection Units, Euphrates Volcano Outfit and Syrian rebel and Kurdish forces. They have suffered maximum losses compared to any other group. More than 70,000 young Alawite have been killed and 120,000 are wounded. Another 10,000 are still unaccounted for. This indicates the complexity of crisis and conflict against Islamic States.

The defeat of Islamic States being an international threat requires regional and international rebalancing to increasingly devote their attention and resources to fight the Islamic State, rather than prioritizing battles with each other. The role of regional countries is critical, particularly surrounding Levant to include two non-Arab states of Iran and Turkey and one Arab power of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

These countries have dealt the threat of Islamic States differently that Islamic States took advantage of its war on Shiite dissent and accordingly has prioritized the defense of its core supply lines, arranged equipment and much-needed recruits and strategically they demonstrate flexibility in its offensive operations.

Iran supports Iraqi Shiites and al Assad government, so that Islamic State does not hold the power in Damascus and Baghdad and could threaten Iran again. The Turkey obviously is hostile towards al Assad regime and many commenters believe that it sees the Islamic State as less of a threat than al Assad. While the Turkish government denies such charges, but rumors of alleged shipments of weaponry to unknown parties in Syria by the Turkish intelligence was a dominant theme in Turkey’s recent elections. However, Turkey expects the Islamic State to be defeated by the United States and it gains politically in Syria.

The Iranian nuclear program is less important to the Americans than collaboration with Iran against the Islamic State. The US and allies contemplate that Islamic State threatens Israel and western bloc with its ideology, particularly if it spreads to Palestine and across. US and western alliance seem ready to accommodate with past Arab rival al Assad being less dangerous than the Islamic State.

The Islamic State poses an existential threat to Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for a transnational Islamic movement. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, along with some other Gulf Cooperation Council members and Jordan, want to contain Islamic State transnationalism without conceding the ground to the Shiites in Iraq and Syria.

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries have forged an air capability used in Yemen that might be used elsewhere if needed, but a balance and mindset between political secular Islam bridging fault line between Sunni versus Shiite, and other complex and interacting factions is far from forging meaningful alliance. This however gives advantage Islamic States.

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is increasingly surrounded by sectarian turmoil threatened by Islamic States that can affect the kingdom’s security and political culture.  The Kingdom in the south has poverty-stricken and sectarian divided Yemen, which seems to have joined Somalia as a failed state adjacent the southern approaches to the Red Sea (and Suez).  To the north, Syria and Iraq are awash in sectarian violence as Islamic States terrorists seek to establish a caliphate.

The integrity of Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is vital for greater stability of Muslim World and fight against Islamic States due to some obvious reasons: The Kingdom’s landmass is bigger than the other States of Gulf, stretching from the Persian Gulf to the Red Sea, which is mostly empty and difficult to defend against creeping terrorists’ network of networks as Kingdom has sparse population, which is about 80% is concentrated in three urban centers.

Given the geographical complexity, the Kingdom’s security concern are due to spillover effects of terrorism, proxies, concerns over spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), sustaining and maintaining oil related infrastructure and industry and threat of rebellion and aggression erupting from the neighbors.

The Kingdom has to play a critical role in fight against Islamic States and other proxies responsible for regional insecurity. Therefore, Kingdom must accord priority to domestic and regional internal challenges and revisit its own national internal security strategies in order to institutionalize its own integral and regional internal security strategic initiatives to consolidate its place as the regional Arab leader and help its neighbors fight for stability and prepare upcoming challenges both outside its borders and from within.

Syed Wajid Ali    ISIS Security Challenges to KSA

More Laws Less Order

Marcus Tullius Cicero more than two thousand years ago, said, “the more laws, the less justice”. Justice means much more than mere order in society. Order remains missing in everyday life of a common man in this land of the pure. Like other policies of the state, enforcement remains the Achill’s heel of the executives since 2002. Unfortunately, in National Action Plan, reforming the criminal justice system is given the least importance. Senior bureaucrats complain about absence of political will to implement National Action Plan. Changes in legal framework in the Punjab have yet to trickle down at enforcement level. Focus has been on making local and special laws to address misuse of loud speakers or graffiti and even this trend is not followed in other provinces with same zeal.

In FATA age old system is not delivering results and Karachi has temporarily come under control after investing huge resources in the form of Sindh Rangers to shield police from political interference in criminal justice administration. Major urban centres remain under threat of public commotion and prevention of once very ordinary street crimes, like one wheeling, are not tackled effectively. Senior bureaucrats complain about absence of political will to implement National Action Plan. Changes in legal framework in the Punjab have yet to trickle down at enforcement level. If removing graffiti by some sectarian organisations becomes threat to personal safety of law enforcement officers then what to say about preventing illegal road blocks and action against proscribed organisations aka armed militias? How can mere changes in legal frameworks, despite its importance, can yield results?

At least five police laws are operational in Pakistan in federal and provincial territories. In the wake of plethora of changes after the 18th Constitutional (Amendment) Act, 2010, Police Order 2002 (PO 2002) was replaced by the Police Act 1861 (PA 1861) in Sindh. Balochistan followed suit and enacted Balochistan Police Act 2011 which is just another version of Police Act of 1861. The Punjab was only to follow it in 2013 by making fundamental changes in Article 7, 18, 21 and repealing Article 184 which required approval of the Chief Executive, for any province level amendments. This has opened Pandora’s Box for all the provinces to make changes in the Police Laws. It is interesting to note that none of the provinces has made any meaningful changes in eighty years old Police Rules 1934 which deals with functioning of Police Stations and which has direct impact on “service delivery”. Without changing the management style of Police Station, it is not possible to expect any change in organisational culture of Police at ground level.

To top it, new laws are being passed by the legislature like The Fair Trial Act 2013 and The Protection of Pakistan Act 2014. Changes in role of prosecutors, evidence submission procedures and witness protection are brought in pieces without incorporating them in the Penal Code of Pakistan 1860, the Evidence Act 1984 and the prosecution laws of the provinces. Situation is more interesting in federally controlled areas like Islamabad and Gilgit-Baltistan because these areas remained as they were since 1947. Position of Police laws is also not different in Azad Jammu and Kashmir and what to talk about FATA where pundits do not want to bring any change at the cost of rights of people of FATA. Whose interests are served if not the people who want order in their lives through state institutions? International Crisis Group and many other local and international NGOs and experts demand replacing Frontier Crime Regulation of 1901 in FATA with Police Act 2002 and abolishing B areas of Balochistan where poorly trained levies are performing the role of law enforcement agency even in 21st century.

There are two views about legal position of Police Act and role of Federal Government and the Provincial Governments. Proponent of provincial autonomy claim that after the 18th Amendment, Policing is not mentioned in Federal Lists I or II and it is exclusively in the provincial domain to amend the Police Order 2002 or Police Act 1861. In addition Article 142 (b) also empowers the provincial governments to make changes in criminal law and criminal procedure i.e. Cr.P.C. 1898 and Pakistan Penal Code 1860. However, Police Act or Police order is not mentioned in this article specifically.

Advocates of a uniform Policing legal framework make a point that Policing was always a provincial subject in the constitutions of 1934, 1956, 1962 and 1973. However Police laws, just like a centralised and uniform judicial structure, were in the federal ambit to ensure uniformity across the country. Even in 1955 when changes in laws inherited from Indian Constitution of 1934 were brought by the then Governor General, Police Act remained within the scope of the federal government. This point of view is buttressed by the ruling given by the Chief Justice of Pakistan in Karachi law and order case when he declared that Police Order 2002 is a federal law and provinces cannot change it unilaterally.

Rule of law trough a professionally trained police service requires uniform standards of recruitment, training, investigation and prosecutions across the country. If present trend of creating provincial police laws continues there are less chances that interprovincial coordination will improve for exchange of prisoners or for transfer of cases from one province to other under a common legal framework. Uniformity of police laws, just like judicial framework, is pre-condition of an effective policing system in the country. Implementation of National Internal Security Policy is needed which states, “the police system of every province is functioning under different Police Acts but somewhat uniform judicial set up. A uniform and coordinated response needs uniformity in Police Laws and enforcement procedures”.

From international coordination perspective, it makes more sense to have a uniform Policing structure and legal framework in the country. It is hard to liaise with the international community through a variety of local laws and nuances of each law enacted in various federating units of the country. In countries where there are various local laws of counties or states, there is one umbrella law which makes it easy for the other states to coordinate and cooperate on issues of mutual legal assistance. A uniform legal framework of law enforcement was in vogue before and after enactment of PO 2002 and after trying variety of laws in post 18th Amendment scenario, it is pertinent to enforce PO 2002 across the country including FATA, GB, ICT and Azad Jammu and Kashmir.

Is political leadership, with the support of able bureaucrats and police commanders, capable to handle this challenge? Can National Action Plan succeed without implementation of robust uniform police laws and reforming criminal justice system?

Akbar Nasir Khan      (ank@post.harvard.edu)